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I. INTRODUCTION

We live in a democratic society.' We enjoy the right to choose our political leaders in secret ballot elections after having had the opportunity to ponProfessor, St. Mary's University School of Law. A.B. 1982, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle; J.D. 1985, Harvard Law School. For Derek Teeter. I would like to express my gratitude to Juliana Fong, William B. Koffel, Deborah Letz, Paul V. Lyons, Aurelia Vincent, Jin Xu,
and my students. Any errors are mine, but I'm willing to share.
I
Providing a definitive interpretation of "democracy" would be far beyond my abilities. As
Professor Dahl has explained, the concept now "is not so much a term of restricted and specific
meaning as a vague endorsement of a popular view." ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS
CRrICS 2 (1989). At a minimum, however, it would embrace "the vision of people governing
themselves as political equals, and possessing all the resources and institutions necessary to do so.
... Id. at 341. In a similar vein, Professor Unger reasons that "[t]he defining elements of democratic practice are the organized competition for the control of governmental power, the appeal
to a mass electorate as the final arbiter of this contest, and the sanctity of guarantees that allow the
opponents of the people in office to associate and to propagandize." ROBERTO MANGABEIRA
UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK 56 (1987); see also JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 122 (1980) ("Discussions of the meaning of 'democracy,' no matter
*
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der the competing candidates' promises, analyze the media's evaluations of the
issues, and participate in the debate through our exercise of free speech. We
cherish this means of self-governance, and we have engaged in probing critiques
of perceived flaws in our electoral process and the need to protect it from the
specters of corruption, apathy, and undue influence.2
In the private sphere, American workers also participate in a democracy,
an industrial democracy where they decide whether they wish to be represented
by a union for purposes of collective bargaining. Pursuant to the National Labor
Relations Act (the "Act"),3 employers and unions wage robust campaigns to win
the workers' allegiance, workers debate unionization among themselves, and the
process commonly culminates in secret ballot elections supervised by the National Labor Relations Board (the "Board"). 4 These labor representation elections are designed to be freely held, majority rule contests analogous to campaigns for public office.5
This fundamental choice of whether to unionize is for the workers
themselves to decide without any governmental favoritism or coercion. As the
late Justice Douglas declared,
how scrupulous they are about noting the existence of some variations in understanding, seem
invariably to include political equality, or the principle that everyone's vote is to count for the
same, in their core definition.").
2
For provocative examples of such critiques, see ISAAC D. BALBUS, MARXISM AND
DOMINATION:

A NEO-HEGELIAN, FEMINIST, PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF SEXUAL, POLITICAL,

AND TECHNOLOGICAL LIBERATION 359 (1982), asserting that "representative democracy both implies and reproduces a division between the active few and the passive many in which the latter
become dependent on the former"; ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 188 (1998), concluding
that democracies have demonstrated "an unexpected capacity for coping with the problems they
confronted - inelegantly and imperfectly, true, but satisfactorily"; E.J. DIONNE, JR., WHY
AMERICANS HATE POLITICS 10 (1991), arguing that Americans "do little to promote the virtues
that self-government requires or encourage citizens to believe that public engagement is worth the
time"; WILLIAM F. STONE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICS 264 (1974), acknowledging that "broad
political participation may be impossible," but intimating that "the search for a truly participatory
form of democratic society will continue"; UNGER, supra note 1, at 56, maintaining that "democracy as an ideal has only a precarious hold on reality"; Richard Davies Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory - and its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 224, 249 (1981), exploring "the routine political ineffectiveness and quiescence - rooted in social and economic inequality - of masses of
ordinary citizens."
3
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
Id. § 159(c)(1)(B) ("If the Board finds ... a question of representation exists, it shall direct
an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.").
5
For excellent discussions of labor representation elections, see generally JULIUS G. GETMAN

4

ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY (1976); ROBERT E. WILLIAMS,

NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT (Labor Relations & Pub. Policy Series No. 8 rev. ed.
1985); Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal
Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495 (1993); Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in
Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REV. 38 (1964);
Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA,
96 HARv. L. REv. 1769 (1983).
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Any procedure requiring a "fair" election must honor the right
of those who oppose a union as well as those who favor it. The
Act is wholly neutral when it comes to that basic choice. By § 7
of the Act, employees have the right not only to "form, join, or
assist" unions but
also the right "to refrain from any or all of
6
such activities."
Justice Douglas therefore concluded that "[t]he Board in its supervision
of union elections may not sanction procedures that cast their weight for the
choice of a union and against a nonunion shop or for a nonunion shop and
against a union."7 The Board, in other words, must not attempt to influence the
workers' freedom of choice regarding unionization.
Democracy is seldom free from conflict, however, and labor representation elections are often marked by tension, controversy, and even blatant hostility between the opposing sides. 8 As Professor Cox observes, "[t]he struggle for
recognition is the bitterest phase of industrial relations." 9 Such antagonism can
result in a myriad of abuses, including a union's resort to voter intimidation' ° or

6

NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270, 278 (1973) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157); see also

Bok, supra note 5, at 47 (reasoning that "any attempt on the Government's part to determine the
grounds on which a union should be selected or rejected would seem inconsistent with a statutory
scheme that appears to rely entirely upon the employees to decide this question.").
7
SavairMfg. Co., 414 U.S. at 280.
8

This turbulence has deep historical origins. As Cochran and Miller relate, nineteenth-

century American employers "all shared an almost psychopathic fear of having to meet the representatives of labor on a footing of equal authority." THOMAS C. COCHRAN & WILLIAM MILLER,
THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE 238 (rev. ed. 1961). These animosities continue to the present day. See,
e.g., CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? 5 (1993) (detailing "the great antipathy United
States employers have exhibited toward the organizational rights of their employees."); Derek C.
Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Characterof American Labor Law, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394,
1409-10 (1971) ("Throughout the course of labor relations in America, large numbers of employers have made strong and persistent efforts to avoid union organization and collective bargaining."); Timothy A. Canova, Monologue or Dialogue in Management Decisions: A Comparison of
Mandatory Bargaining Duties in the United States and Sweden, 12 COMP. LAB. L.J. 257, 259
(1991) ("In the United States .... the mere legitimacy of union representation is systematically
undermined by virulent employer opposition."); Paul C. Weiler, Milestone or Tombstone: The
Wagner Act at Fifty, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 9, 11 (1986) (discussing a "remarkable rise in illegal employer resistance to collective bargaining" and asserting that "the vast majority of employers do strongly oppose unionization in the campaign, and a substantial minority resort to dirty
tactics to try to win the battle.").
9
Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 48 (1947).
tO
See, e.g., Knapp-Sherrill Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 1547, 1548 (1968) (finding that workers had
been threatened with possible job loss or other employment difficulties if they did not support the
union); G.H. Hess, Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 463, 465 (1949) (concluding that a union had threatened an
antiunion worker with "economic reprisal" and possible bodily harm if she voted in the election).
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an employer's reliance on bribes," violence, 12 and unlawful termination of union supporters. 3 The Board has long recognized its responsibility for preventing such tactics and assuring the basic fairness of labor representation elections. 14 In its landmark General Shoe Corp.5 decision, the Board proclaimed:
In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a
laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under
conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of employees. It is our duty to establish those conditions; it is also our duty to determine whether they have been
fulfilled. When, in the rare extreme case, the standard drops too
low, because of our fault or that of others, the requisite laboratory conditions are16not present and the experiment must be conducted over again.
Such laboratory conditions can be contaminated by public officials as
well as by employers and unions. In fact, as I will demonstrate, government
officials have repeatedly jeopardized laboratory conditions by campaigning in
labor representation elections. Dueling democracies have been inadvertently
created, where the labor-related electioneering of our democratically selected
officials threatens to undermine the industrial democracy of the workplace.
My analysis of this dilemma contains both descriptive and prescriptive
components. On the descriptive level, I will delineate the Board's consistent
failure to articulate doctrines and remedies that would protect workers from
possible confusion and coercion and preserve the integrity of these elections.
Even in the isolated instances where the Board has sought to redress such prob-

11

See, e.g., Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 1106, 1110 (1984) (promising wage in-

creases if employees rejected union), enforced, 787 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1986); Borden Mfg. Co.,
193 N.L.R.B. 1028, 1031 (1971) (vowing to be more generous in granting benefits to employees if
the union lost the election); Paterson Fire Brick Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1118, 1119 (1951) (offering to
rehire a laid-off employee if the union lost the election).
12
See, e.g., Garvey Marine, Inc., 328 N.L.R.B. 991, 994-95 (1999) (involving a supervising
pilot threatening to attack prounion deck hands), enforced, 245 F.3d 819 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
13
See, e.g., Schaeff Inc. v. NLRB, 113 F.3d 264, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (firing workers in response to organizational activity); Morehead City Garment Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 245, 248 (discharg-

ing employees to discourage unionization), enforced as modified per curiam, 191 F.2d 1021 (4th
Cir. 1951).

14 As Professor Pollitt has explained, "A bribed or coerced vote does not represent the free and
informed choice by the voter, and when bribery or duress is shown to have occurred, the NLRB
will set aside the results of an election and direct a new one." Daniel H. Pollitt, The National
Labor Relations Board and Race Hate Propaganda in Union Organization Drives, 17 STAN. L.
REv. 373, 393 (1965).
15 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
16

Id. at 127.
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lems, its reasoning has been too ambiguous and shortsighted to provide a lasting
solution. Indeed, the Board's most recent opinions reveal its fundamental failure to eradicate the consequences of such governmental interference.
On the prescriptive level, I suggest a proposal that would recognize the
right of public officials to speak out during labor campaigns while simultaneously shielding workers from both intended and unintended political pressure.
My proposal entails three interrelated steps. First, the Board must assure workers of their right to vote in an autonomous and uncoerced manner. Second, the
Board must clarify that public officials engaged in campaigning are simply stating their personal preferences rather than enunciating government policy. Third,
the Board must reiterate its own institutional impartiality in the election and its
dedication to vindicating the workers' freedom of choice.
II. GUARDING THE GUARDIANS: PROTECTiNG LABORATORY CONDITIONS
FROM BOARD AGENT INTERFERENCE

In General Shoe, the Board frankly acknowledged that laboratory conditions could be spoiled "because of our fault" as well as the transgressions of
employers, unions, and others.' 7 Indeed, in numerous cases the Board has confronted situations where its own agents have jeopardized an election's legiti-18
macy. The leading opinion in this area is Athbro PrecisionEngineering Corp.,
where a Board agent supervising the balloting was observed drinking beer with
a union representative during a break in the voting. 19 Based on this fraternization, the employer argued that the union's victory should be vacated because
"the behavior of the Board agent gave an appearance of irregularity to the conduct of the election, thus departing from the standards of integrity which the
Board seeks to maintain." 2 °
In a unanimous opinion, the Board ruled in the employer's favor even
though there was no evidence that the Board agent's conduct had influenced the
election's outcome. As the Board reasoned, it was necessary to invalidate the
union's triumph and hold a new election because
[t]he Board in conducting representation elections must maintain and protect the integrity and neutrality of its procedures.
The commission of an act by a Board Agent conducting an election which tends to destroy confidence in the Board's election
process, or which could reasonably be interpreted as impugning
17

Id.
166 N.L.R.B. 966 (1967), vacated sub nom. Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v.
NLRB, 67 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2361 (D.D.C.), acq. in result 171 N.L.R.B. 21 (1968), enforced, 423
F.2d 573 (lst Cir. 1970).
19
Id. at 966.
18

20

Id.
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the election standards we seek to maintain, is a sufficient basis
for setting aside that election. 21
Through the implementation of this standard, the Board has sought to
prevent the appearance of favoritism. 2 Rooted in the need to preserve laboratory conditions, the Board strives to assure that even inadvertent misconduct by
its agents does not cast a cloud of suspicion over the balloting. Although the
Board has not been perfectly consistent in its application of Athbro,23 it has invoked the basic holding to vacate numerous elections that raised the specter of
Board agent partiality. 24 The Athbro doctrine is thus an important fixture in the
Board's electoral jurisprudence, 25 but its reasoning should not be limited to
cases of Board agent interference. As explained below, there are equally important instances of electoral interference by other types of government officials
that must also be addressed.
III. BEYOND ATHBRO: PROTECTING LABORATORY CONDmONS FROM OTHER
FORMS OF GOVERNMENTAL INTERFERENCE

The Board, of course, is not the only governmental entity that could
spoil laboratory conditions through the appearance of favoritism. In truth, numerous non-Board government officials have interjected their arguments in labor representation elections in ways that could engender confusion and coercion
on the part of the voters. In contrast to Athbro, however, the Board's approach
21

Id.

22

See, e.g., 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 469 (Patrick Hardin & John E. Higgens, Jr. eds.,

4th ed. 2001) (explaining that "[tihe Board holds its agents to high standards of accuracy and
neutrality in the conduct of elections and sets aside elections in which its agents do not meet those
high standards.").
23
For a critique of such vacillation, see John W. Teeter, Jr., Keeping the Faith: The Problem
of Apparent Bias in Labor Representation Elections, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 909, 911 (1990) (asserting the need for strict prophylactic adherence to the Athbro standard).
24
See, e.g., Jakel, Inc., 293 N.L.R.B. 615, 616 (1989) (setting aside election based on agent's
improper removal of a ballot from the ballot bag); Hudson Aviation Servs., 288 N.L.R.B. 870, 870
(1988) (vacating election based on agent's heated dispute with employer's assistant manager);
Laszo & Paulette Fono, 273 N.L.R.B. 1326, 1328 (1984) (invalidation due to agent's failure to
comply with the Board's Casehandling Manual); Alco Iron & Metal Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 590, 591
(1984) (setting aside election where agent had union observer translate voting instructions for
workers); Glacier Packing Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 571, 572-73 (1974) (setting aside election for
agent's emotional confrontation with employer's staff); Kerona Plastics Extrusion Co., 196
N.L.R.B. 1120, 1120 (1972) (nullifying election results due to agent's premature closure of a
voting session).
25
As Judge Harry T. Edwards has summarized, "The Board attempts, as near as possible, to
hold elections in a laboratory condition. This requires the Board and its agents to maintain an
appearance of neutrality in conducting fair and impartial elections." North of Mkt. Senior Servs.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 204 F.3d 1163, 1167-68 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
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to these forms of official intrusion has been decidedly anemic. As a result, the
right of workers to a free and untrammeled choice has been repeatedly undermined.
A.

Bad Beginnings: Originsof the Board's Insensitivity to Governmental
Interference

Ormet Corp.26 is an early example of the Board's insensitivity toward
possible governmental interference. In Ormet, the United Steelworkers of
America challenged an election it lost to a rival union, the Baton Rouge Metal
Trades Council. 27 The Board dismissed this challenge, however, and specifically rejected both of the Steelworkers' claims that public officials had undermined the voters' freedom of choice. 28 According to the Steelworkers, the local
sheriff harassed its representatives, told citizens that they could obtain employment only on the sheriff's terms, and created a "reign of terror" by threatening
black employees that they had better refrain from supporting the Steelworkers.29
In a terse dismissal of this allegation, the Board simply concluded that "the Regional Director reported that no evidence . . . had been offered by the 30Steelworkers, and none was obtained by him in the course of his investigation.
The Steelworkers also alleged that the parish police jury had campaigned actively against them and instigated a negative "whispering campaign.",31 This charge was also rebuffed, as the Board contended that only one
employee had stated that a member of the police jury had contacted him and that
he had simply been urged to support another union (the Aluminum Workers).32
The Ormet Board's failure to support its opinion with detailed reasoning
is troublesome. Given the Steelworkers' allegations that the sheriff had terrorized local black employees, the Board needed to undertake a more critical scrutiny of the regional director's claim that there was no substantiating evidence.
This is particularly true in light of the election's
context-the deep southern ham33
let of Burnside, Louisiana in the 1950S.
26

122 N.L.R.B. 159 (1958).

27

Id. at 160.

28

Id. at 162.

29

Id. at 160.

30

Id. at 161.

31

Id. at 160.
Id. at 161.

32

In other cases the Board has been more attentive to the racial dynamics of a contested election. See, e.g., Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 72 (1962) (vacating election in small Georgia
town where employer distributed inflammatory racial propaganda). Much has been written on
how the Board should react when ethnic hate speech is used as a form of campaign propaganda.
See generally Nicholas A. Beadles & Christopher M. Lowery, Union Elections Involving Racial
Propaganda: The Sewell and Bancroft Standards, 42 LAB. L.J. 418 (1991) (analyzing Board
33

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 106

The Board's cursory rejection of the Steelworkers' second allegation is
equally suspect. The Board acknowledged that one employee had received a
message from the police jury that he should vote for the Aluminum Workers,
but the Board failed to explore the context of that communication. Being cornered by a law enforcement representative to vote a particular way in a hotly
contested election with racial overtones raises obvious possibilities of coercion
and would be sure to fuel speculation regarding the government's stake in the
campaign. At a bare minimum, the Board should have investigated the nature of
the communication and its possible inconsistency with the duty to assure a free
and untrammeled choice on the part of the workers.
B.

Ambiguities and Equivocation: Lees and its Progeny

Following Ormet, the Board decided a series of cases purporting to protect workers from various forms of official interference. These decisions, however, have been marred by vagueness and a myopic inability to perceive the
inherently problematic nature of political intrusions into representation elections. The Board has thus overturned elections in a few particularly egregious
cases but has failed to adopt strong prophylactic measures to palliate the corrosive impact of steadily recurring governmental interference.
James Lees & Sons Co. 34 is the progenitor of this doctrinal equivocation. In Lees, there was a massive effort by local newspapers, townspeople, and
public officials (including a mayor, a county attorney, and a city councilman) to
oppose a union's organization drive at a Virginia textile mill.35 This antiunion
campaign included editorials, leaflets, letters, advertisements, and personal visits
warning that the union's election could cause the mill to close.36 Based on such
sustained, multifaceted pressure, the Board ruled,
[W]e agree with the Regional Director that the numerous statements and conduct by various responsible groups and individuals in the community ... reasonably conveyed the view to the
employees that in the event of unionization the Employer would
shut down its plant and other employers would not locate in the
policy and court decisions regarding racially based campaigning); Pollitt, supra note 14 (advocating dialogue as the best response to racial hate speech); Rudolf Sachs, The Racial Issue as an
Antiunion Tool and the National Labor Relations Board, 14 LAB. L.J. 849 (1963) (calling for
stricter Board regulation of racial speech); John W. Teeter, Jr. & Christopher Burnett, Representation Elections, Anti-Semitism and the National Labor Relations Board, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L.
341 (1998) (examining the Board's failure to deter Judeopathic electioneering); Note, Employee
Choice and Some Problems of Race and Remedies in Representation Campaigns, 72 YALE L.J.
1243 (1963) (questioning the practicality of the Sewell standard).
34
130 N.L.R.B. 290 (1961).
35
See id. at 290-91.
36

Id. at 292-98.
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community. Accordingly, we find that such conduct created a
general atmosphere of fear and confusion which precluded the
holding of a free election. We shall, therefore, set the election
aside and order a new election.37
Lees was correctly decided, for the Board recognized that no electoral
experiment could be legitimately conducted amidst "fear and confusion." Given
the harsh warnings of plant closure from public officials, prominent businessmen, neighbors, and journalists, there was abundant evidence that the workers'
ability to make a free choice had been imperiled. Furthermore, the Board correctly calibrated the standard for determining whether an election should be
vacated, explaining that "it reasonably appears that the freedom of choice of the
employees could have been interfered with. 38 To insist upon any higher standard of proof would make it inordinately difficult to demonstrate a breach of the
requisite laboratory conditions.
Lees's precedential power was undermined, however, by the protean nature of the pressure in that case. The Board did not accentuate the public officials' participation in the antiunion campaign, and there is no indication how the
Board would have ruled if the mayor, county attorney, and city councilman had
acted alone. For that reason, Lees has not stood as a bulwark against possible
governmental intimidation in labor elections.
Three years later, the Board echoed Lees's ambiguities in UticaHerbrand Tool Division of Kelsey-Hayes Co. 39 Here again public officials (including the mayor, local police officers, and members of the state legislature)
joined forces with local media and influential citizens to blanket a small southem town with its antiunion warnings. 4° In conjunction with the employer, these
community officials and civic leaders reiterated in "letters, home visits, leaflet
distribution, radio newscasts and spot announcements, and newspaper editorials
and advertisements" that a union victory would force the employer to relocate
and result in local economic distress. 4' The Board therefore concluded that such
propaganda "created an atmosphere of fear of reprisal and loss of job opportunity" which "prevented the exercise of free choice in the election. 42
As in Lees, the political pressure did not take place in isolation but was
supplemented by the lobbying of civic leaders and the media. The Board did,
37

Id. at 291.

38

Id. at 291 n.1 (emphasis added). As Bok explains, "judges and administrators have agreed

that actual interference with an election need not be shown to establish a violation of the law; it is
enough that the conduct in question tends to have these effects." Bok, supra note 5, at 42 (emphasis added).
39
145 N.L.R.B. 1717 (1964).
40

Id. at 1717-20.

41

Id. at 1719-20, 1723-26.
Id. at 1719.

42
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however, single out certain conduct by officials for specific disapproval. The
Board remarked,
We note further the coercive elements present in the home visits
of local police officers and the mayor of the city, and in the distribution of antiunion propaganda at all banks in the community. Such pressures, although not emanating from the Employer, exerted a coercive effect upon the employees' free
choice and, in conjunction with [the other antiunion campaign
tactics], form a basis for setting aside the election.43
Yet, even here, there was significant ambiguity, for the Board neglected
to specify whether it was the identity of the campaigners or the location of the
electioneering that rendered the home visits coercive. It is commonly understood that management representatives cannot make campaign stops at an em44
ployee's domicile. As the Board stated in Peoria Plastic Co.,
"calling upon
[workers] at their homes to urge them to reject a union" constitutes "conduct
calculated to interfere with the free choice of a bargaining representative regardless of whether or not the employer's actual remarks were coercive in character., ' 45 Utica-Herbrandtherefore failed to clarify the significance, if any, of the
home visitors' status as public officials.
In Ely & Walker,46 the Board continued this pattern of reaching a sensible result but through insufficient analysis. Here, the mayor of still another
sleepy southern town and a member of the chamber of commerce were held to
have coercively campaigned by telling workers they "would not have a union
because the Respondent [employer] was opposed to it, that the Respondent
would pay a lawyer $1,000 a day to keep the Union out, and that it would do the
employees no good
to get a contract because the Respondent would merely
'sweat it out."'4 7 The trial examiner reasoned that these remarks violated the
employees' rights because they "implied that the Respondent would not recognize and bargain with the Union in good faith and were calculated to instill in
the minds of employees the futility of selecting the Union as their collectivebargaining representative. 48
The trial examiner's conclusion was sound, but he did not delineate the
scope of his reasoning. It violates section 8(a)(1) of the Act for any representa43

Id. at 1719-20.

44

117 N.L.R.B. 545 (1957).

45

Id. at 547-48. For a concise discussion of this issue, see WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 303-07.

46

151 N.L.R.B. 636 (1965).

47

Id. at 650.

48

Id. The Board affirmed the trial examiner's rulings with no elaboration on this aspect of the

case. See id. at 637.
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tive of the employer to imply that unionizing would be futile,49 and no emphasis
was placed on the mayor's position as a public official. 50 As in Lees and UticaHerbrand,there was no concrete effort to analyze the potential perils posed by a
government official's involvement in a labor representation campaign. 5'
In contrast, in Richlands Textile, Inc.,52 the administrative law judge
("AU") specifically emphasized the public position of an antiunion campaigner.
In this case, Mohn, a member of the North Carolina House of Representatives,
mailed the employer's work force a letter warning that a union victory would
cause the plant's closure and that "hundreds of people . . . would lose their
jobs., 53 After relating that Mohn was "a long-established businessman," a
''prominent citizen," and a "member of the local establishment," the AU
stressed the critical factor:
But more importantly, Mohn was the elected state representative of the district and had held this position for 8 years. As
such, it is apparent that a majority of those in the district regard
Mohn as knowledgeable regarding matters that affect his constituents, and, as their representative, they believe that he is reasonably alert to protect their interests. 4
The ALT then held that the employer violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by failing to repudiate Mohn's letter.55 As he explained, "the Company in effect
As 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2000) provides, it is "an unfair labor practice" for management
"to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights" to support or oppose
unionization. Suggesting that it would be fruitless for workers to organize is commonly found
violative of this provision. See, e.g., Taylor Chair Co., 292 N.L.R.B. 658, 662 (1989) (employer
stating he would not sign a contract with the union), aff'd, 899 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1990) (unpublished table opinion); Trane Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1506, 1510 (1962) (employer claiming he would
unilaterally set wages regardless of the union's presence).
5o
Instead, the trial examiner noted the mayor's non-governmental importance, observing that
49

he was an officer of the town's only bank and that the bank held mortgages on some of the workers' homes. Ely & Walker, 151 N.L.R.B. at 643.
51
This ambiguity is underscored by the Board's opinion in Proctor-Silex Corp., 159 N.L.R.B
598, 610-11 (1966), where the Board affirmed the trial examiner's ruling that a community business committee's coercive antiunion electioneering interfered with the workers' right to a fair
election. Id. at 611. Proctor-Silex makes no mention of governmental officials serving on the
committee, and so it is uncertain if the Board in Lees and Utica-Herbrandattached any importance to the political status of the management-side advocates in those cases.
52
220 N.L.R.B. 615 (1975).
Id. at 616-17. The ALJ stressed that Mohn "wrote in the full panoply of his office as state
representative," using "the official governmental stationery and letterhead of the North Carolina
Assembly." id. at 618.
54
Id. at 618 (emphasis added).
53

35

Id. at 619.
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acquiesced in and ratified by its silence and inaction the unqualified and unequivocal statement in Mohn's letter that he had been informed that the Com56
pany would begin closing the plant if the employees voted for the Union."
Again, Mohn's official status was key to the analysis:
Upon slight reflection, it would occur to a reader of the letter
that a person of Mohn's responsibility in the community, and
who was speaking to them as their elected state representative,
would not state categorically that the Company would close the
plant if the employees voted for the Union, unless he knew that
this was the fact and the facts came from "the horse's mouth,"
so to speak .... [An] employee-reader of Mohn's letter may
have concluded that not only did Mohn's information come
from the Company but that the latter had57suggested to Mohn
that he inform his constituents of such fact.
Such logic is commendable, for it recognizes that a state official is not
just "some Joe Doakes who had made a statement at the local coffee shop or in a
grocery store. 58 To the contrary, a government representative's statements can
be particularly problematic. Many workers will assume that the official has
special access to information regarding the probable consequences of unionization. Furthermore, such workers may believe that the official is legitimately
trying to protect their welfare and uphold the economic stability of the community. Richlands Textile is thus an encouraging case where the Board, for the first
time, explicitly recognized the particularly coercive potential of governmental
campaigning in representation elections.
The opinion, however, was not an unmitigated blessing. Although the
Board fully adopted this aspect of the AU's recommended order, it did so without explicitly addressing his focus on Mohn's involvement. Furthermore, even
the AU overlooked a fundamental reason why a public official's participation
in labor representation campaigns can unduly interfere with the workers' freedom of choice. This, in essence, is the fear of governmental retaliation. Workers may understandably be loath to defy the stated preferences of a powerful
politico in the midst of a heated struggle between management and labor. Indeed, such workers may suspect that a vote adverse to the official's interests
could leave them with a vindictive foe in the halls of government.
Such distrust of government is a deeply ingrained component of our culture. 59 This trepidation transcends all demographic boundaries 6° and has grown
56

Id.

57

Id. at 618-19.

58

Id. at 618.

59

According to Professor Orren,
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appreciably worse in recent decades. 6' As Professor Orren concludes, "The
public has not only lost faith in the ability of government to solve problems, but
it has actually
come to believe that government involvement will just make mat62
ters worse.
It is therefore understandable that many workers could feel apprehensive when a government figure ventures into the labor campaign process. Given
their lack of confidence in the fundamental integrity of such officials, employees
might reasonably question whether disregarding a government representative's
electoral preferences could entail negative consequences.6 3
The American republic was born in a climate of suspicion that persists to this
day. "Distrust of government," writes Samuel Huntington, "is as American as
apple pie. It has historically been a central, continuing, and distinctive element of the American political tradition and the idea that people should trust
their government is a radical departure from that tradition."
Garry Orren, Fallfrom Grace: The Public's Loss of Faith in Government, in WHY PEOPLE DON'T
TRUST GOVERNMENT 77, 88-89 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr., et al. eds., 1997). On a related theme, social
scientists have emphasized the critical role human psychology plays in political perceptions and
participation. See generally CAROL BARNER-BARRY & ROBERT ROSENWEIN, PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS (1985); EXPLORATIONS IN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY (Shanto Iyengar &

William J. McGuire eds., 1993); HANS J. EYSENCK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICS (1999); FRED I.
GREENSTEIN,

PERSONALITY

AND

POLITICS:

PROBLEMS

OF

EVIDENCE,

INFERENCE,

AND

CONCEPTUALIZATION (1969).

Orren, supra note 59, at 84. As Orren explains, "Today's public cynicism cuts across all
categories-black and white, male and female, rich and poor .... Loss of faith in government has
attached itself to every population group." Id. It is noteworthy that among blue-collar workers,
the average score on "Trust in Government" declined from 52 in 1964 to 25 in 1994 (on a scale of
from 0 to 100). Id. at 86-87 tbl. 3-1.
61
Orren states:
60

Since 1964, for example, the number of Americans who feel that the government is run by a few big interests looking out only for themselves has more
than doubled (to 76 percent), and the number who believe that public officials
don't care about what people think has grown from 36 percent to 66 percent.
The number saying that quite a few people running the government are
crooked increased from 29 percent to 51 percent.

Id. at 81.
62

Id.

63

Whether an individual worker feels coerced by such political pressure will, of course, de-

pend on the precise facts and personalities involved in a given case. As the late Professor Hayek
understood, "[w]hether or not attempts to coerce a particular person will be successful depends in
a large measure on that person's inner strength .... " FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION
OF LIBERTY 138 (1960). As Cox attests, "[w]ords which may only antagonize a hard-bitten truck
driver in Detroit may seriously intimidate a rural textile hand in a company village where the mill
owners dominate every aspect of life." ARCHIBALD Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY
44 (Inst. of Indus. Relations, Monograph Series No. 5, 1960). Similarly, different employees will
vary in their predispositions to submit to government authority. See, e.g., ERICH FROMM, ESCAPE
FROM FREEDOM 21 (1941) (inquiring "how can we account for the attraction which submission to a
leader has for so many today?"). Again, however, the key to remember is that the issue is whether
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The Board, however, has not contemplated how the public's distrust of
government, coupled with the intrusion of politicians in representation elections,
could erode laboratory conditions. Instead of reflecting an emerging sensitivity
to the perils of official coercion (real or perceived), the Board's opinions remain
clouded with equivocation. Columbia Tanning Corp.64 exemplifies this persistent institutional ambivalence.
In contrast to earlier cases, in Columbia Tanning the public official was
campaigning on behalf of a union instead of management and the setting was
northern rather than southern. 65 Here, the Massachusetts Commissioner of Labor sent immigrant factory workers from Greece a letter in their native tongue
lauding the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union as "a powerful and
honest Syndicate" and a leader in defending employees' rights. 66 After the union was elected, the employer challenged the result on the grounds that workers
could have confused the Commissioner of Labor's office with the Board and
thereby failed to appreciate the Board's impartiality. 67 The Board's regional
director rejected this objection, arguing that the letter was "merely an endorsement ... by an official of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts" and that "it
would be unreasonable to conclude" that it gave workers "the impression that
the United States Government or the Board itself' supported the union.68
The Board, however, overruled the regional director and invalidated the
election. In language spawning conflicting interpretations, the Board decided
that "the letter solicited and distributed by the [union] improperly suggests governmental approval" of its campaign. 69 This was clearly improper, for "no participant in a Board election should be permitted to suggest either directly or indirectly to the voters that this government agency endorses a particular
choice., 70 The Board then explained how the commissioner's letter easily could
have confused the workers regarding the Board's electoral neutrality. These
employees (most of whom had recently arrived in America and about half of
whom did not understand English) "in all likelihood were not familiar with the

such conduct tends to coerce workers, not whether a particular employee felt subjectively intimidated. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
64
65

238 N.L.R.B. 899 (1978).
See id. at 899.

67

Id. at 899 & n. 1.
Id. at 899-900.

68

Id. at 901.

69

Id. at 900.

70

Id. at 899-900.

66
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complexities of state and federal jurisdiction over labor relations.'
reason

For that

[t]hey could not be expected to discern readily the difference
between the state "Department of Labor" and the Federal "National Labor Relations Board," particularly in light of the fact
that both contain the word "Labor" in their titles. From the perspective of the Greek employees, both agencies could reasonably have been perceived as part of one "government" which was
conducting the election. The potential for confusion eliminates
the Board's appearance of impartiality and thereby interferes
with the exercise of a free choice in the election.72
The Board's reasoning is rather ambiguous. On one level, Columbia
Tanning suggests a bold, prophylactic protection of workers from any governmental interference with their right to a free and untrammeled choice. Such is
the import of the conclusion that "the letter ...improperly suggests governmental approval" of the union.73
When read in context, however, the opinion simply emphasizes that the
Board's aura of impartiality must not be tarnished. The Board members' root
concern was not necessarily with the impropriety of governmental partiality in
the abstract, but only with the appearance of possible Board favoritism. As
such, Columbia Tanning has done little to protect workers from the potentially
coercive pressure of countless officials outside the Board.
This is regrettable, for the Board confronted a case ripe with potential
intimidation. Recent immigrants, presumably with little understanding of our
political structures and constitutional guarantees, could readily fear disregarding
the strongly worded endorsement of the state's Commissioner of Labor, especially when the letter was printed on the Commissioner's governmental letterhead and would therefore seem to be issued in his official capacity. Futhermore,
the likelihood of coercion was increased because, as the employer argued, the
Commissioner exercised "a significant degree of control over the terms and conditions of employment in ...Massachusetts, particularly over alien workers. 74
The Board's apparent focus on its own image of impartiality thus seems unduly
parochial; the real grounds for invalidating the election should have been the
possibilities of confusion and intimidation inherent in the Commissioner's statement.
71

Id. at 900.

72

Id.

73

Id.

Id. at 900 n.4 (alteration in original). In fact, the commissioner had the statutory responsibility "for administering wage and hour laws and health and safety provisions as well as those
laws which make it illegal to employ aliens without work permits." Id.
74
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The Board's parochialism was replicated by the Ninth Circuit in Micronesian Telecommunications Corp. v. NLRB. 75 In Micronesian, the employer
appealed the Board's refusal to hold a hearing on its claim that the president of
the Northern Marianas Senate and a local mayor fouled laboratory conditions by
campaigning for the union. 76 Based on Columbia Tanning, the employer asserted that "employees' exercise of free choice is impaired when one party misleads voters to believe that that party's position has official governmental imprimatur. ,77
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, however, and upheld the Board's order.
The court opined:
The Columbia Tanning election was not invalidated by the
Board merely because a state officer expressed support for the
union, but because it could have easily appeared that the Board
favored one side or the other. In this election, [the employer]
did not claim that it appeared the NLRB favored one side or the
other, nor did it otherwise demonstrate that the alleged misconduct interfered with the employees' exercise of free choice.78
These arguments are of dubious worth. First, the Ninth Circuit failed to
consider the foreseeable perplexity engendered when public officials participate
in representation elections. Such campaigning can clearly mislead workers into
believing that the Board, as well as the endorsing politico, supports one of the
competing parties.7 9 Second, the court concluded that the employer failed to
demonstrate an interference with laboratory conditions, yet the Board had refused to hold a hearing where the employer might have established such a
breach through testimony, cross-examination, and other supporting evidence.8 °
75

820 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1987), enforcing 279 N.L.R.B. 1114 (1986).

76

Id. at 1102.

77

Id.

78

Id.

See, for example, Ursery Cos., 311 N.L.R.B. 399, 399-400 (1993) (Oviatt, dissenting), for
an elaboration on this theme. The majority and dissenting opinions in Ursery are discussed infra
at notes 82-98 and accompanying text.
79

Parties challenging an election are not automatically entitled to a hearing on their objections. As the Board has explained,
80

Section 102.69 of the Board's Rules and Regulations sets forth election procedures, including the handling of objections. It provides for the holding of a
hearing when it appears to the Board that exceptions to the report of a Regional Director on objections raise substantial and material factual issues. In
accordance therewith, the Board has held that unless substantial and material
issues of fact are raised a request for a hearing will be denied. The Board has
rejected the contention that a Respondent is entitled as a matter of right to a
hearing on objections to an election. In order to prevent delay in election pro-
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Third, it is disheartening that the court replicated the Board's blunder by failing
to weigh the intrinsically coercive possibilities when public officials endorse
sides in labor campaigns. 8' Such potential intimidation may be particularly
problematic in Micronesian, where the residents of a tiny, remote island commonwealth were confronted with the political arm-twisting of both a mayor and
the president of their senate.
C.

The Costs of Equivocation: The Board's Failure to Redress Governmental Interference

The timid, ambivalent nature of Lees and its progeny is more than just
theoretically suspect; it has had adverse practical consequences for the health of
industrial democracy. The Board's failure to recognize and address the inherent
dangers of governmental interference has led it to uphold election results notwithstanding the clear likelihood of voter confusion or intimidation.
In Ursery Cos.,82 for example, the Board interpreted Columbia Tanning's ambiguities in a way that deprived workers of protection from political
pressure. In Ursery, a member of the Connecticut House of Representatives
wrote a letter endorsing the union, which the union reprinted on its stationery
and distributed among the workers. 83 In a two-to-one opinion, the Board held
cedure the Board has uniformly refused to direct a hearing on objections
unless the party supplies specific evidence of conduct which prima facie
would warrant setting aside the election.
O.K. Van & Storage, Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 1537, 1539 (1960), enforced, 297 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.
1961).
In analogous situations, this restrictive approach to hearings has been the focus of scholarly
critique. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 427 ("By granting the party which has alleged that
the election has been unfairly conducted an opportunity to subpoena witnesses, cross-examine the
agent involved, and generally air the facts surrounding the claim of impropriety, the Board would
do much to overcome the notion that it actually is partial in election matters.").
81
Serious institutional concerns are presented when the reviewing courts drift into complacency and fail to scrutinize and correct the errors and omissions of administrative decision makers.
As Professor Frug has explained:
The judicial review model [of administrative law] assigns the role of police
officer to the courts, and the model's ability to legitimate bureaucracy rests on
this judicial role. Bureaucratic legitimacy is derived from the courts' own legitimacy: it is because we can trust the courts that we can trust the bureaucracy.
Geral Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1276, 1334 (1984)
(both explicating and critiquing the judicial model and other justificatory paradigms of administrative power).
82
311 N.L.R.B. 399 (1993).
83

Id. at 399. Among other statements, the representative asserted that "the Union is powerful

and wins for its members." Id. at 400.
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that the letter did not violate laboratory conditions." The majority first distinguished Columbia Tanning on the grounds that, in Ursery, the representative's
title did not include the word "Labor," and his letter appeared only as a reduced
reproduction on the union's letterhead. 85 The majority then argued that Columbia Tanning's main concern had been "whether and to what extent a document
imitates a Board publication and under what circumstances it can be said that
the Board or the United States favors one party to the election. 86 Finally, the
majority extolled the workers' political sophistication, claiming that they should
be able to distinguish between the Board and a state legislator.87
As Board Member Oviatt explained in his dissent, such reasoning fails
to consider the possible problems created by the representative's letter. Oviatt
stressed that the employees understood little or no English and concluded that
"the letter impermissibly suggests Government sanction of the union in the election. 88 Taken literally, Oviatt appeared to assert that an endorsement by any
public official would taint the election and require vacature of the result. This
reading is bolstered by Oviatt's emphasis that "the employees received what
appears to be an official letter from a Connecticut representative endorsing the
Union .... 89
Unlike the majority, Oviatt recognized the limited understanding many
employees have of the intricacies of federal law, state law, and the complex,
multi-natured role of administrative agencies. 90 This, of course, would be of
special concern among immigrant workers with a minimal grasp of English. In
contrast to the majority's sanguine assurances - unsupported by any evidence of the workers' understanding of our governmental institutions, Oviatt asserted:
[T]hese employees in all likelihood would not readily discern
the distinction between Connecticut State government and the
Board as an agency of the Federal Government . .

.

.[T]hese

employees' possible unfamiliarity with the structure of Government creates the likelihood that the employees could have

94

Id.

85

Id at 399.

86

Id.

87

Id. at 399 n.2.

88

Id. at 399-400 (Oviatt, dissenting).

89

Id. at 400 (Oviatt, dissenting).

90

For a helpful historical overview of the evolving roles of administrative agencies in our

democratic system of self government, see generally
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEss

24-41 (3d ed. 1999).

RICHARD

J. PIERCE,
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been misled as to the impartiality of the "government" in the
election. 9'
Oviatt's reasoning was compelling, for many Americans have little
knowledge of how government operates and the practical and jurisdictional divisions within it. Even experienced attorneys can be bewildered by the administrative maze, its statutory origins, and its interrelationships with the three main
branches of government. 92 Furthermore, political scientists have identified "disturbing patterns" of misinformation that reveal "the public is ignorant about
much of the detail of government and politics ...
As examples, only thirty
percent of respondents in a scientific study could identify both of their United
States senators, and only twenty-nine percent could name their member in the
House of Representatives. 94 More generally, Carpini and Keeter conclude:
Only 13 percent of the more than 2,000 political questions examined could be answered correctly by 75 percent or more of
those asked, and only 41 percent could be answered correctly
by more than half the public. Many of the facts known by relatively small percentages of the public seem critical to understanding - let alone effectively acting in - the political world:
fundamental rules of the game; classic civil liberties; key concepts of political economy; the names of key political representatives; many important policy positions of presidential candidates or the political parties; basic social indicators and significant public policies. And for at least some measure of political
knowledge, Americans appear significantly less informed than
citizens of most other comparably developed nations. Hardly
the stuff of informed consent, let alone of a working representative democracy.95
In the face of such pervasive misunderstandings, the linguistically challenged workers in Ursery could easily have thought that the state representative
was speaking on behalf of "the government" and that "the government" encom91
92

Ursery, 311 N.L.R.B. at 400 (Oviatt, dissenting).
Some years ago, a licensed attorney complained bitterly that he could not locate a particular

agency regulation in the United States Code Annotated. His eyes shined with a sense of mystical
discovery as I revealed the existence of the Code of Federal Regulations.
93

MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOT

KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS

AND WHY IT MATTERS 101, 17 (1996).

94
Id. at 94 tbl. 2.11. Furthermore, "many Americans believe the president has the power to
adjourn Congress at his will (35 percent), to suspend the Constitution (49 percent), and to appoint
judges to the federal courts without the approval of the Senate (60 percent)." Id. at 99.
95

Id. at 101-02.
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passed the Board. As Oviatt appreciated, "[a] suggestion of governmental approval of any party to an election eliminates the Board's appearance of imparti96
ality and thereby interferes with the exercise of a free choice in the election."
Oviatt was correct that any governmental endorsement of a party creates
a per se peril to the Board's aura of neutrality, and without this appearance of
impartiality, there can be no free and fair election. In addition, the state representative's testimonial was potentially coercive itself. For the representative to
write, "I am sure.., you will see that the Union is powerful" and that "in unity
there is strength" naturally raises questions about the plight of workers who defy
that power and support the employer. 97 Workers may understandably hesitate to
rebuff the endorsement of a legislator who could potentially affect their lives in
a myriad of benevolent and not-so-benevolent ways.98
Two years after Ursery, however, the Board reached an even more
deeply disturbing decision in Chipman Union, Inc.99 In Chipman, the Board
ruled that a letter from Congresswoman Cynthia A. McKinney did not interfere
with the election in that case.' ° This letter was written on House of Representatives stationery and sent to more than five hundred workers shortly before the
election. 0 1 Among other statements, Representative McKinney stated,
This letter is written in support of your struggle for respect, dignity, and justice as employees with Chipman-Union, Inc. I urge
you to continue to fight and strive for fairness in the workplace.
It is important to unite, organize and support each other .... I
embrace you, Chipman-Union employees, in your struggle for
fairness and justice in the workplace. 102
The Board held that this rather dramatic call to arms did not transgress
laboratory conditions. 0 3 The Board first argued that McKinney's letter "does
not even mention [the union], the election, unionization, Congress as a whole, or
the National Labor Relations Board . . . ."104 Such reasoning, however, fails to
recognize that these appeals to "unite" and "organize," in the culminating days
96

Ursery, 311 N.L.R.B. at 400 (Oviatt, dissenting) (citing Columbia Tanning Corp., 238

N.L.R.B. 899 (1978)).
97

Id.

As Professor Bell has concluded, "rather than risk challenging any authority - however
benign - most people will defer to it." DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY 152 (1994).

98

99

316 N.L.R.B 107 (1995).

100

Id. at 107.

101

Id.

102

Id.

103

Id. at 108.

104

Id. at 107.
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of the election, were obviously engineered to enhance support for the union.
Furthermore, Representative McKinney's stationery, message, and signature
line all identified her as a member of Congress, so the Board's observation that
she did not additionally refer to "Congress as a whole" merits little weight. Finally, that the letter did not overtly name the Board seems insignificant when
McKinney was plainly addressing the election to be conducted by that agency.
The Board's next line of arguments is equally questionable. The Board
stressed that "the letter does not indicate, and the Employer does not claim, that
Congresswoman McKinney had any specific authority over labor matters within
Congress."'' 05 This assertion seems weak, for most workers would be unlikely
to know whether Representative McKinney's precise committee assignments
pertained to labor-management relations. The Board also erred by adopting the
hearing officer's rationalization that McKinney's letter "reads as the personal
expression of a political and partisan being speaking for herself."' 6 If that were
true, why would McKinney have thrice reminded the workers - through her
stationery, text, and signature line - of her official position as a United States
representative? Such argument, moreover, ignores that a member of Congress,
unlike a private citizen, has the power to voice her "personal expression [as] a
political and partisan being" by voting on key legislation and taking other actions that could affect the workers' interests in many different ways.' °7
The Board then claimed that the employer had failed to demonstrate
"that its employees could not discern the difference between statements about
labor relations by an individual member of Congress and statements by the
Board and its representative.' '0 8 Such reasoning is deceptive, for the employer
was never given an adequate occasion to make the showing. As the Board acknowledged, the hearing officer "relied on proceduralgrounds" to overrule the
employer's objection and had issued a "refusal to expand the investigation" of
that objection. 109 As a consequence, the employer never had an adequate opportunity to demonstrate the workers' possible confusion regarding Congress and
the Board. Perhaps even more important, the Board offered no justification for
its de facto presumption that workers do in fact comprehend such complexities
unless the objecting party can prove the contrary.
The Chipman Board's final tactic was to distinguish Richlands Textile,
Inc."0 on the grounds that "it was clear that Representative McKinney was
speaking only for herself and that her message contained no threat or coercive

105

Id.

106 Id.
107

Id.

108

Id. at 107-08.

109

Id. at 107 (emphasis added).

110

220 N.L.R.B. 615 (1975); see supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
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statement whatsoever.""' Once again, the Board's rationalizations elide the
core concerns. Chipman did not entail the direct, palpable coercion of Richlands Textile, but intimidation is always a matter of degree." l2 Employees in a
contentious organizational campaign could predictably fear crossing swords3
with a Congresswoman who had expressed a deep interest in the election."
This is particularly so when, contrary to the Board, it was far from clear whether
McKinney "was speaking only for herself." In addition to having repeatedly
highlighted her message with the imprimatur of Congress, McKinney may have
been receiving financial or political support from the union. In perhaps the
weakest aspect of its opinion, however, the Chipman Board ruled:
We ... find it immaterial whether Congresswoman McKinney
sent the letter because the [Union] and its members had provided support to her. What matters here is the content of her
letter, not why she wrote it. Consequently, we affirm the hearing officer's evidentiary rulings excluding evidence of any financial relations
between the [Union] and Congresswoman
4
McKinney. 11
Reasoning such as this borders upon the specious. Having claimed that
McKinney was speaking solely for herself, the Board then precluded any discovery of whether she may have been a paid agent of the union or the beneficiary of its campaign contributions. The actual "content" of the letter - and its
likely impact on workers - could not be interpreted in the absence of the surrounding context of her history with the union and any economic and political
entanglements. In sum, the Chipman Board unjustifiably refused to examine the
multiple possible improprieties of McKinney's intrusion into the representation
campaign.
111 316 N.L.R.B. at 108.
112
See HAYEK, supra note 63, at 138 (observing that "[tihere are many degrees of coercion").
For an in-depth discussion of competing concepts of coercion, see Michael T. Gibson, CongressionalAuthority to Induce Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity: The ConditionalSpending Power
(and Beyond), 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 439, 473-92 (2002).
113
Such anxiety is especially foreseeable given the public's widespread distrust of both congressmen and union leaders. As studies demonstrate, "'fewer than one out of five [Americans]
feel that congressional leaders can be believed."' SEYMOUR MARTnN LIPSET & WILLIAM
SCHNEIDER, THE CONFIDENCE GAP: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND GOVERNMENT IN THE PUBLIC MIND 15
(rev. ed. 1987) (quoting Daniel Yankelovich, Emerging Ethical Norms in Public and Private Life
2-3 (Apr. 20, 1977) (unpublished manuscript)). Similarly, labor leaders "are believed to be exceptionally corrupt and unethical." Id. at 220. In fact, one poll found that 64 percent of the public
agreed with the statement that "[m]any union leaders have known ties with racketeers and organized crime." Id. at 219 tbl. 7-4. Representative McKinney's campaign letter thus created a significant likelihood that workers may have thought twice about ignoring her edict.

114

316 N.L.R.B. at 107 n.3.
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Despite these serious flaws, Chipman was invoked by the Board in
Saint-Gobain Abrasives, Inc.' 5 In Saint-Gobain, the employer challenged a
narrow union victory on the grounds that the United States Congressman for the
district had campaigned energetically for the union." 6 In particular, the Congressman had opined:
The Company has also refused to debate [an] important issue,
claiming that federal labor laws do not allow a fair debate because the laws restrict what an employer can say. As a United
States Congressman with a strong interest in labor law, I can assure you that the law does indeed allow for a fair debate. If the
company chooses not to debate, that is their right, but they
should not hide behind misstatements about federal regulations.1 17
In essence, the Congressman accused the employer of deceiving the
workers regarding campaign speech. Such an allegation is highly questionable
on the merits' 8 and potentially inflammatory. The majority simply parroted
Chipman, however, holding that "the Employer failed to establish that employ-
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169 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1116 (Dec. 20, 2001).

116

The Union won by a tally of 406 to 386 with eighteen challenged ballots. Id. at 1117.

117

Id. (Hurtgen, dissenting).

118
See id. Putting it gingerly, Chairman Hurtgen noted in his dissent that "there is responsible
view to the contrary." Id. It is true that under section 8(c), employers have the right to campaign
against unions as long as their statements contain "no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit." 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000). Undeniably, however, there are stringent limitations on
employer campaign speech. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) (restricting an employer's freedom to make predictions regarding the possible effects of unionization on
the company); NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964) (prohibiting employers from
promising benefits to affect the election's outcome); American Warehousing & Distrib. Servs.,
Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 371 (1993) (barring employers from suggesting that it would be futile to support the union); Peoria Plastic Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 545 (1957) (disallowing employer campaign
visits to employees' homes). Employer campaign speech is regulated more stringently than that of
unions because of the economic power employers wield over their workers. As the court explained in NLRB v. Golden Age Beverage Co., 415 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1969), "[an employer in an
unorganized plant, with his almost absolute control over employment, wages, and working conditions, occupies a totally different position in a representation contest than a union, which is merely
an outsider seeking entrance to the plant." Id. at 30. See also ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR

LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS

146 (13th ed. 2001) ("Any argument which discloses the speaker's

strong wishes is not wholly an appeal to reason if the listener is in the speaker's power."); Thomas
G.S. Christensen, Free Speech, Propagandaand the National Labor RelationsAct, 38 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 243, 265 (1963) (stating that "when the boss talks, employees may suspect that the is doing
more than talking.").
For detailed discussions of section 8(c)'s scope, see generally Herbert
Burstein, Free Speech for Employers, I LAB. L.J. 425 (1950); Cox, supra note 9, at 15-20; Robert
F. Koretz, Employer Interference with Union Organization Versus Employer Free Speech, 29
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399 (1960).
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ees 'could not discern the difference between statements about labor relations by
an individual member of Congress and statements by the Board.. ,,, 119
Here the majority replicated the Chipman Board's failure to appreciate
the potential for puzzlement and coercion when a government representative
intercedes emotionally into a labor campaign. Furthermore, as Chairman Hurtgen explained in his dissent, it is "far from certain" that workers comprehend the
distinctions among the three main branches of government and regulatory agencies.1 20 Finally, the Congressman's loaded analysis of federal regulation of employer campaign speech was especially problematic.' 2' As Hurtgen reasoned:
[A] Congressman should ... stay away from that issue in the
context of pro-party comments in an ongoing organizational
campaign. The danger is that employees are likely to view that
statement as definitive. After all, it comes from a Federal official. Conversely, an employer response would not carry the
same weight. As to matters of law, employees are likely to
view the response of a Federal official
as more reliable than that
22
of a private party to the election.
Hurtgen was certainly on target in his emphasis that speech by federal
officials is not analogous to that of private parties, for the former enjoy an aura
of governmental expertise not shared by common members of the public. His
dissent, however, was far too narrow. The central problem in Saint-Gobain was
not merely that the Congressman addressed an esoteric point in labor law but
that he threw his political weight behind one of the contending forces in the
election. Yet again, even dissenting Board members have failed to consider an
everyday laborer's anxiety about transgressing the specific, passionate exhortations of a public official. In an election, the worker is entitled to focus on her
professional and psychological best interests. Her choice, after all, may be a
crucial turning point in her working life.' 23 She should be able to make this
119

Saint-Gobain, 169 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1117 (quoting Chipman Union, Inc., 316 N.L.R.B.

107, 108 (1995)).
120
Id. at 1118 (Hurtgen, dissenting).
121

See id. at 1117. Hurtgen cautioned that "because of their official position in the U.S. Gov-

ernment, [members of Congress] must be especially careful in opining on controversial issues of
Federal law." Id.
122

Id.

123

As I have argued elsewhere:
A worker's decision on whether or not to unionize may be the most critical
choice of her professional life. Not only will it affect vital material issues
such as her future wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, it is also a primary act of self-expression and collective selfdetermination.
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fundamental decision in a laboratory free from the pressure of any government
officials, whether they are Board agents or members of Congress.

IV. A PROPOSAL TO SAFEGUARD LABORATORY CONDITIONS
The Board's responsibility to protect the workers' freedom of choice is
beyond question. It is also clear that government officials can perplex and intimidate voters when they interject their beliefs into labor representation campaigns. It therefore behooves the Board to decide upon a sensible solution to
this dilemma.
One obvious - and obviously unsatisfactory - response might be to forbid governmental authorities from expressing their viewpoints in labor contests.
Such an approach would raise grave constitutional concerns, 124 and it would be
politically perverse to restrain public officials from speaking out on the issues of
the day. Rather than engage in a quixotic attempt to silence such officials, the
Board should simply move to obviate any resulting confusion or coercion on the
part of the workers.
Here the Board could solve, or at least ameliorate, the problem through
a deliberate extension of its current practice. The Board routinely informs
workers of their right to select or reject union representation and assures them of
the Board's neutrality. For example, the Board's "Notice of Election" assures
workers of their "right to a free, fair, and honest election" and that "[t]he National Labor Relations Board protects [their] right to a free choice.' 25 The Notice also states, "The National Labor Relations Board as an agency
' 26 of the United
States Government does not endorse any choice in the election."'
Such notifications readily could be extended to govern cases where public officials have campaigned for the employer or union. The Board should explicitly reassure the work force that (1) employees have the legal right to vote as
their consciences dictate, (2) the official's statements reflect only her personal
perspectives rather than authoritative government policy, and (3) the Board is
Teeter, supra note 23, at 984.
124
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) ("The general proposition
that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long
been settled by our decisions."); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962) ("The role that
elected officials play in our society makes it all the more imperative that they be allowed freely to
express themselves on matters of current public importance.").
125 NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., NOTICE OF ELECTION, FoRM NLRB-707 (1991).
126

Id. Similarly, the Board's publication Your Government Conducts an Election provides,

"You are entitled by federal law to vote your free choice in a fair, honest, secret-ballot election to
determine whether employees want union representation." Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., Your Government Conducts an Election 4 (July 2000), at http://www.nlrb.gov/publications/election.pdf (last
visited Aug. 2, 2003). This publication also reiterates, "When an election is held, the Board protects your right to a free choice under the law ....
The National Labor Relations Board as an
agency of the United States Government does not endorse any choice in the election." Id. at 4-5.
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neutral with regard to the election's outcome and will protect the workers' freedom of choice. In this manner, officials would remain free to opine on desirable
electoral outcomes, but the risks of confusion and coercion would be minimized.
To enhance the accessibility and credibility of these assurances, Board
personnel should verbally explain them to the employees in addition to posting
them at the workplace. There are multiple reasons why these guarantees must
be given in oral as well as written form. Millions of American workers have
extremely limited or even nonexistent reading skills. According to the Business
Council for Effective Literacy, approximately seventy-two million adults are
either completely or functionally illiterate. 127 Similarly, the National Assessment of Education Progress has found that thirty-six million adults could not
read at the eighth-grade level and that seventy million fell shy of the eleventhgrade level. 128 Such literacy barriers can be even more daunting in cases such as
Columbia Tanning129 and Ursery Cos., 130 where many of the employees did not
understand English.
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that even literate employees would
happen to see a written notice at the workplace and stop to read it. The simple
truth is that not all workers consult company bulletin boards where such notices
are commonly placed. As studies have shown, some employees do not frequent
those areas of the plant near
the bulletin boards or are too preoccupied with
31
work to read their contents.'
Finally, oral communication to workers is typically far more effective
than written notification.
For generations it has been known that
"[p]sychological tests indicate that leaflets or other printed propaganda devices
cannot match the persuasive power of oral presentations."' 132 As many work127

Joanne Draus Klein, Waking Up to the American Nightmare: One in Five Workers is Func-

tionally Illiterate,a Chilling Statisticfor any Company, 16 CORP. CLEVELAND 34, 34 (1992).
128
Jonathon Kozol, Illiteracy Statistics: A Numbers Game, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1986, at A31;
see also JONATHAN KozOL, ILLITERATE AMERICA 4 (1985) ("Twenty-five million American adults
cannot read the poison warnings on a can of pesticide, a letter from their child's teacher, or the
front page of a daily paper.").
129
238 N.L.R.B. 899 (1978); see supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
130

311 N.L.R.B. 399 (1993); see supra notes 82-98 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., HELEN BAKER ET AL., TRANSMITING INFORMATION THROUGH MANAGEMENT AND
UNION CHANNELS 41-43 (1949). Parallel concerns have been raised in the context of Boardordered written notices stating that employers have been found guilty of violating the Act and will
take specific remedial steps. As one scholar has commented, "[t]here is more than a modicum of
doubt as to whether notices are read, understood, or sufficient to allay the apprehensions and
misgivings caused by the employer's unfair labor practices." Peter B. Hoffman, Notice Posting:
A Pilot Study, 18 LAB. L.J. 556, 557 (1967); see also John W. Teeter, Jr., FairNotice: Assuring
Victims of Unfair Labor Practices That Their Rights Will Be Respected, 63 UMKC L. REV. 1, 2
(1994) (calling for the oral reading of all notices of employers' unfair labor practices).
132
Note, Union Right of Reply to Employer On-the-Job Speeches: The NLRB Takes a New
131

Approach, 61 YALE L.J. 1066, 1074 (1952). Leading studies supporting this conclusion include
LEONARD W. DOBB, PUBLIC OPINION AND PROPAGANDA 529-32 (1948) (describing superiority of
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place-related studies have demonstrated, "[f]ace to face communication is most
effective" in the organizational setting. 33 Combining oral with printed reassurances of the Board's neutrality and the workers' freedom of choice would therefore best counteract coercion and perplexity.
Such a step would not be a guaranteed cure-all. Some confusion could
persist, and it is foreseeable that certain workers might continue to feel hesitant
about spurning a government official's preferences in the election. The anonymity of the balloting process, however, coupled with methodical, potent assurances of the Board's neutrality and commitment to protecting the workers'
rights, should go a long way toward reducing any residues of puzzlement or
compulsion to an acceptable minimum. 134
public meetings over radio broadcasts in influencing people); JOSEPH T. KLAPPER, COLUMBIA
UNIV., THE EFFECTS OF MASS MEDIA H-9 TO 11-10 (1949) ("The lecturer was found to be the most
effective in modifying opinions . . . and the printed material least effective."); PAUL F.
LAZARSFELD ET AL., THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE:
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 128-29 (2d ed. 1948)

How THE VOTER MAKES UP His MIND IN A

(discussing radio's superiority over newspaper in

political contests); RAYMOND W. PETERS, COMMUNICATION WITHIN INDUSTRY: PRINCIPLES AND
METHODS OF MANAGEMENT-EMPLOYEE INTERCHANGE 78 (1950) (analyzing advantages of oral
communication); WALTER H. WILKE, AN EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON OF THE SPEECH, THE RADIO,
AND THE PRINTED PAGE AS PROPAGANDA DEVICES 27 (1934) ("Several independent indices of the

results of the propaganda used showed the speaker technique to have the most striking positive
effects.., and the printed technique to have only a slight effect."). These sources are also cited in
Teeter, supra note 131, at 12 n.56.
133
Stuart M. Klein, Communication Strategiesfor Successful Organizational Change, INDUS.
MGMT., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 26, 27; see also Richard L. Daft & Robert H. Lengel, Organizational
Information Requirements, Media Richness and Structural Design, 32 MGMT. Sci. 554, 560
(1986) ("Face-to-face is the richest medium because it provides immediate feedback so that interpretation can be checked."); Fredric M. Jablin, Superior-SubordinateCommunication: The State
of the Art, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1201, 1202 (1979) (observing that "face-to-face discussion is the
dominant mode of interaction" in the workplace); Jerry Tarver, Face-to-FaceCommunication, in
INSIDE ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION 205, 220 (Carol Reuss & Donn Silvis eds., 1985)
("Face-to-face communication in all its forms continues to be important."); Cynthia Stohl & W.
Charles Redding, Messages and Message Exchange Processes, in HANDBOOK OF
ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION 451, 487 (Fredric M. Jablin et al. eds., 1987) (explaining that
"ambiguous work environments are more effectively clarified (not surprisingly) through face-toface rather than written communication"). Notwithstanding these conclusions, the need remains
for further research. See, e.g., Robert A. Snyder & James H. Morris, OrganizationalCommunication and Performance,69 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 461, 461 (1984) (noting that "studies of communication in work organizations are grossly underrepresented in the empirical research literature");
Joanne Yates & Wanda J. Orlikowski, Genres of OrganizationalCommunication: A Structurational Approach to Studying Communication and Media, 17 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 299, 320 (1992)
("Empirical research is needed to investigate the various social, economic, and technological
factors that occasion the production, reproduction, or modification of different genres in different
sociohistorical contexts."). These sources are also cited in Teeter, supra note 133, at 12 n.57.
134
Our inability to eliminate all elements of possible intimidation is, of course, no excuse for
not taking feasible steps toward reducing such pressures and maximizing the workers' freedom of
choice. As Hayek realized,
We cannot prevent all harm that a person may inflict upon another, or even all
the milder forms of coercion to which life in close contact with other men ex-
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V. CONCLUSION

More than half a century has passed since the Board announced the
laboratory conditions standard of General Shoe Corp., 35 and more than thirtyfive years have elapsed since the Board decided Athbro Precision Engineering
Corp.136 Confusion and coercion remain real threats, however, due to the participation of government officials in labor representation campaigns. We are
confronted, in essence, with a problem of dueling democracies: non-Board public officials should be free to support or oppose unionization, but we must prevent their electioneering from undermining the industrial democracy of labor
elections.
The Board's responses to this quandary have been equivocal and ineffective. Although James Lees & Sons Co. 13 7 and its progeny indicate some
awareness of the problems posed by governmental interference, they lack both
the institutional vision and doctrinal teeth to bring such problems to heel. In
fact, Chipman Union, Inc. 138 and Saint-Gobain Abrasives, Inc. 13 9 demonstrate
the Board's failure to grasp the potential puzzlement and pressure imposed upon
workers when public officials intervene in representation elections. Such ambiguities and inaction must be replaced with doctrinal clarity and meaningful prophylactic protection.
My proposed solution would be simple, efficacious, and fair. The
Board should reassure workers of their right to cast uncoerced ballots, clarify
that the political officials are not declaring governmental policy, and emphasize
that the Board is both impartial in the election and committed to protecting the
workers' freedom of decision. In this manner, dueling democracies might
evolve into dynamic democracies, where workers can critically appraise the
opinions of government representatives yet remain confident of their power to
vote as they choose.

poses us; but this does not mean that we ought not to try to prevent all the
more severe forms of coercion, or that we ought not to define liberty as the
absence of such coercion.
135

supra note 63, at 139.
77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948); see supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.

136

166 N.L.R.B. 966 (1967), vacated sub nom Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v.

HAYEK,

NLRB, 67 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2361 (D.D.C.), acq. in result 171 N.L.R.B. 21 (1968), enforced, 423
F.2d 573 (1st Cir, 1970); see supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
137
130 N.L.R.B. 290 (1961); see supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
138

316 N.L.R.B. 107 (1995); see supra notes 99-114 and accompanying text.
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169 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1116 (Dec. 20, 2001); see supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.

